A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales by Christina Matzke, Benedikt Wirth
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
Discussion Paper 10/2008
A non-standard approach to a market with
boundedly rational consumers and strategic rms.
Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of
sales
by
Christina Matzke, Benedikt Wirth
May 2008
Bonn Graduate School of Economics
Department of Economics
University of Bonn
Adenauerallee 24 - 42
D-53113 Bonn                                     The Bonn Graduate School of  Economics is
                                                             sponsored by theA non-standard approach to a market
with boundedly rational consumers
and strategic ¯rms.
Part I: A microfoundation for the
evolution of sales
Christina Matzke¤
University of Bonn, BGSE
and Benedikt Wirthy
University of Bonn, BIGS
May 24, 2008
In our model, individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules
based on imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research, social learn-
ing, and related ¯elds. Demand can be viewed as the outcome of a popula-
tion game whose revision protocol is determined by the consumers' behavioral
rules. The consumer dynamics are then analyzed in order to explore the de-
mand side and ¯rst implications for a strategic supply side.
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1. Introduction
Optimal economic choices are often very hard to obtain for consumers. Especially
if a product is new on the market, its quality can only be anticipated. Consider for
example an innovative and new liquid crystal display (LCD) TV shortly after its
product introduction. A potential consumer does not know the true product quality
(cf. Smallwood and Conlisk (1979), p.2), though she can have some (not necessarily
true) idea about it. In such a situation, as supported by studies in social psychology
and consumer research (e.g. Assael (1984), p. 371®; Venkatesan (1966)), consumers
often base their product choices on imitation of others who already own the product.
Imitation can take place either in an implicit or explicit manner. For instance, when
a person encounters someone owning the LCD TV, the familiarity with this product
increases, implicitly rising the probability to buy it. On the other hand, explicit or
deliberate imitation may occur if a consumer understands the product's popularity
as a hint to its past performance (cf. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993)).
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Imitation represents a widely used concept in areas such as evolutionary game theory
or social learning. For example, Schlag (1998) shows that a proportional imitation
rule is better than any other (well-performing or so-called improving) behavioral rule
in a multi-armed bandit environment. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) employ imita-
tion through the concept of popularity weighting. For a high degree of popularity
weighting the agents choose the most popular choice, independent of its payo®. An
extreme result of such imitative behavior is herding. In this context Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) explain how social conventions, norms, fashion or new
behavior can arise through informational cascades. Another approach to modeling
conventions, where the own choice depends also on past actions of others, is due to
Young (1993). In his model n agents, drawn randomly from a population, play an
n-person game. They act as in ¯ctitious play, except that their information about
the predecessors is incomplete and that the agents are not free from errors. Baner-
jee (1992) shows that imitative behavior yields ine±cient equilibria: Herding can
emerge since the agents rather imitate others than following the information con-
tained in their own signal. Word-of-mouth learning is another ¯eld closely related to
imitation and the herding literature and is said to be an important mechanism for
consumers to choose a product brand. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) for example
examine rational word-of-mouth learning. They search for aspects that a®ect the
characteristics of word-of-mouth learning in the long run by investigating several
sampling rules for imitation. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) represents a nice ex-
ample where boundedly rational word-of-mouth learning from a few other agents
may lead to socially e±cient results. Similar forerunners of word-of-mouth learn-
ing are for instance Kirman (1993), where a vivid example of herding (ants eating
only from one of two exactly identical food sources) is explained within a recruiting
model, and the seminal work of Smallwood and Conlisk (1979). In order to iden-
tify market (share) equilibria, they investigate a model in which consumers respond
to breakdowns of their products. As in our model, they consider consumers who
are uncertain about the product quality. Their consumers buy a new product each
period|either of the same brand as before or of another one, depending on whether
a breakdown happened. After breakdown, the consumer makes a decision taking
the population shares into account, i.e. how many agents bought each brand in the
last period. The analysis is then divided into that of weakly dissatis¯ed and strongly
dissatis¯ed consumers, who will not buy the product again. Furthermore, Small-
wood and Conlisk (1979) explore the equilibria for di®erent values of a parameter
representing the consumers' degree of con¯dence in the signi¯cance of brand popu-
larity. Only the best quality brands are used in equilibrium (only weakly dissatis¯ed
consumers) or additionally some non-best (only strongly dissatis¯ed consumers) if
there are moderate consumers' beliefs about brand popularity. In a second step,
Smallwood and Conlisk consider the supply side of the market and assume that the
¯rms set their products' breakdown probabilities each period in order to maximize
their pro¯t. Due to the high mathematical complexity they only obtain approx-
imate ¯rm strategies. For the demand side we use an approach quite similar toC. Matzke
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Smallwood's and Conlisk's paper, extending and re¯ning some ideas, for example
including a weighting of imitation according to (anticipated) product quality as well
as introducing a habit mechanism.
Experiments in consumer research have revealed further important mechanisms of
decision making besides imitation. In particular, consumers obviously also take
their own experience and satisfaction into account, resulting in a habitual behavior
(Assael (1984)). Let us return to the TV example: A consumer who owned an LCD
TV for a while and is satis¯ed with it rather sticks to LCD TVs instead of following
the majority of other agents buying a plasma TV. Consequently, we introduce habit
as a second mechanism.
An indication of habitual purchases was found in several studies, summarized in
Assael (1984, p. 53). Implicitly, the amount of habit induced by a product is also
modeled in Smallwood and Conlisk (1979) via its breakdown probability or so-called
\dissatisfaction probability". The consumers buy the same brand|hence follow
their habit|until they encounter a problem. Expressed in terms of our model, if
the consumers' habit is disturbed, the consumers imitate the buying decision of
other consumers. A habit-related aspect has also already been advanced in the
early papers of bounded rationality (for instance Simon (1955)), where satis¯cing
as opposed to optimizing is motivated. Satis¯cing describes the consumer practice
to already accept the ¯rst satisfying choice instead of extensively searching for the
optimal choice. Similarly, in our model we will assume that consumers who own a
satisfying good will continue to buy it.
Generally, our approach can be classi¯ed as belonging to the bounded rationality
¯eld as it is surveyed in at least three excellent reviews, Ellison (2006), Sobel (2000),
and Conlisk (1996), with focuses on industrial organization, learning, and general
motivations, respectively. There seems to exist quite some work taking a basically
similar perspective as our approach. Early precursors of bounded rationality in
industrial organization focus on ¯rms' rather than consumers' bounded rationality,
for instance Rothschild (1947) and Cyert and March (1956). Another interesting
early paper by Heiner (1983) hypothesizes that predictable behavior in economics
results mostly from rules of thumb behavior of the agents and not from optimizing
agents, since maximizing agents would lead to irregularities on the market. More
recently, Thadden (1992) introduced a model in which the ¯rms act strategically,
whereas the consumers do not, which today represents the most common deviation
from rationality.
In order to describe markets, we will de¯ne a two-level game, of which the lower
level is the content of the present paper (part I). This lower level uses a continuous
time consumer model based on behavioral rules which are reasonable according
to psychologic and experimental studies (Assael (1984), Venkatesan (1966)). The
model is stated in form of a population game as de¯ned in Sandholm (2005) and
Sandholm (2006), who makes use of the fact that for a large population size, the
stochastic process generated by the evolutionary process can be approximated byC. Matzke
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solutions to ordinary di®erential equations (BenaÄ ³m and Weibull (2003)). The upper
level, which will be the topic of a second paper (part II: Product pricing when
demand follows a rule of thumb), describes the strategic behavior of ¯rms, which
base their decisions on the results of the lower level model. Altogether, it will be
seen that two simple rule of thumb ingredients, imitation and habit, are su±cient
to generate typical patterns observed in consumer markets, such as product life
cycles (as described in Kluyver (1977), Brockho® (1967), Polli and Cook (1969)).
Concerning the methodology, we employ a new approach to describe interacting
consumers in continuous time as well as a new method to describe supply and
demand side of a market via a two-level game.
Although a complete market description has to take into account supply and demand
side, the model presented in this ¯rst paper stands on its own. It is for example
in itself applicable in cases where the supply side is (temporarily) inactive, as in
marginal cost pricing (Bertrand, perfect competition), supply sides with strong
inertia, or more general decision processes like choosing when to take one's holiday.
Furthermore, some implications on product feasibility can already be obtained, if
prices and production costs are implicitly encoded in the model parameters.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We start with the introduction of the used
methodology. The general methodology is then applied to a market where demand
follows a simple rule of thumb. Subsequently, we deduce the important sales equa-
tion, motivate an appropriate revision protocol (similar to a transition probability),
and ¯nd the corresponding mean dynamic which determines the demand evolution
dependent on two parameters per product, a convincement factor and a habit coef-
¯cient. Finally, the demand evolution is analyzed for varying numbers of di®erent
products (or brands).
2. Model and microfoundation of sales
This section proposes a mathematical model for the evolution of sales based on
a microfoundation. The microfoundation constitutes a means of macroscopically
describing a system of a large number of interacting agents taking part in a so-called
modi¯ed population game. The agents behave non-rationally and myopically change
their activities. The mean over all agents then provides the governing di®erential
equations to describe the overall system behavior.
After brie°y introducing the methodology of a microfoundation following Sandholm
(2005) and (2006) it is applied to a goods market, yielding a ¯rst simple result about
the relation between the evolution of product distribution and the sales. Finally,
we suggest an exemplary model of consumer behavior and derive the resultant sales
evolution via the methods above.C. Matzke
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2.1. Methodology
A typical normal form game consists of a population of agents, their actions, and
the payo® function which rewards or penalizes the agents' actions depending on
the other players' behavior. Since the agents are usually assumed to be rational,
their behavior directly follows from maximizing the payo®. However, in the case of
non-rational agents the payo® function is insu±cient to determine their actions; a
revision protocol, for example similar to Sandholm (2006), seems more adequate to
describe the agents' behavior.
De¯nition 2.1 (Revision protocol). A revision protocol ½ is a map





x = (x0;:::;xn) 2 [0;1]n+1 j
Pn
i=0 xi = 1
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is called the state space.
The scalar ½ij(x;t) is called the conditional switch rate from activity i to activity j









Before motivating this de¯nition we shall ¯rst use the revision protocol to specify
the model framework.
De¯nition 2.2 (Modi¯ed population game). A modi¯ed population game is de¯ned
by the triple G = (N;A;½), where N is the agent population size, A = f0;:::;ng is
the activity set, and ½ 2 R
(n+1)£(n+1)
+ is a revision protocol.
The motivation is as follows: In a modi¯ed population game a situation with N
agents is considered, each of whom plays precisely one activity i 2 A at a time.
We use the term 'activity' as opposed to the game theoretic term 'action' in order
to emphasize the continuity of the activity in time, whereas actions take place at
discrete times (e.g. in repeated games). The subpopulation of those agents playing
activity i amounts to the time-varying fraction xi of the total population so that
the set of all possible states is given by X = fx 2 [0;1]n+1j
Pn
i=0 xi = 1g. Each
agent playing activity i is equipped with an independent Poisson alarm clock of
rate Ri, i.e. an alarm clock which rings after an exponentially distributed time with
expected value R
¡1
i . Each time the alarm goes o® the agent revises her activity and
switches to activity j 2 A with probability pij.
The objective of studying the macroscopic behavior of a system requires averag-
ing over all agents. In order to limit complexity of analysis we shall make use of
the continuum hypothesis so that di®erential equations can be applied. Hence we
assume N very large with the e®ect that the state space X can be approximated
as continuous and that the mean agent behavior can be approximated by expectedC. Matzke
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behavior according to the law of large numbers. Under these conditions Sandholm
(2006) derives the macroscopic system behavior:
De¯nition 2.3 (Mean dynamic). Let G be a modi¯ed population game, and let ½







½ij(x;t); i = 0;:::;n; (3)
where _ xi denotes the time derivative of xi.
2.2. Application to a consumer market
Let us consider a market consisting of N consumers and n di®erent products pro-
duced by some ¯rms. As opposed to some standard industrial organization models
the focus is here laid on the consumer side of the market, i.e. given the ¯rms' be-
havior in the sense of product properties1 (e.g. price and quality) the evolution of
the market is governed by the consumers' purchase decisions. Though in principle
the application of modi¯ed population games allows for time-dependent product
properties (i.e. time-varying ¯rm strategies) and consumer characteristics, let us
concentrate on a market with static parameters.
The consumers, who take the role of the agents in the modi¯ed population game,
own at most one good each, where the di®erent products are substitutes but not
perfect substitutes to them. Their activity set comprises the activities\not owning
any product", denoted 0,\owning good 1", denoted 1, and so forth. The alarm clock
of each consumer announces the time when she can decide to buy a new product
and hence to switch her activity. Reasons can be a breakage or a defect when
owning a product or a suddenly arising interest of the consumer in a product when
currently being without any good. Due to the memorylessness of such incidents, the
use of a Poisson alarm clock seems most adequate to model their occurrence. Since
the old products are broken, they are disposed and therefore reselling is assumed
to be impossible. Finally, let the ¯rms have|as is standard practice in industrial
organization|perfect knowledge about the consumer behavior depending on the
product properties, and hence they produce exactly as many goods as are demanded
at any time.
2.3. The sales equation
We de¯ne Si(t) as the number of units of product i 2 f1;:::;ng, sold per time at
time t. Si shall be called the sales of product i.
The sales of product i correspond to the rate of consumers switching to or rather
1Exogenously given prices can for instance be applied in a Bertrand competition for oligopolies.C. Matzke














5; i = 0;:::;n: (4)
Using the mean dynamic (3), equation (4) can be transformed into the sales equa-
tion, which describes the relationship between sales and consumer subpopulations,
Si
N
= _ xi + xiRi; i = 0;:::;n: (5)
To enhance intuition, the rate of change _ xi can be interpreted as the di®erence
between consumers adopting and abandoning good i, while the second summand
represents all those owners of good i who currently reorientate themselves and either
abandon or stick with2 product i. As the leaving consumers cancel, the net e®ect
consists of those consumers buying product i.
Let us provide a brief analysis of the sales equation: As indicated above, the equation
decomposes into a pair of additive terms, leading to two cases, each corresponding to
one term outweighing the other. In the case of small xi, e.g. during product launch,
sales precisely re°ect the increasing distribution among the population, e.g. due to
growing product awareness. On the other hand, for negligible _ xi (after reaching a
comparatively stable situation) sales of good i solely originate from replacements of
both defect units of i and di®erent products. The rate of replacements is equivalent
to the rate of consumer reorientation or revision, xiRi.
2.4. A consumer revision protocol and the resulting mean
dynamic
The speci¯c revision protocol which we employ borrows well-established ideas from
social learning (Smallwood and Conlisk 1979, Ellison and Fudenberg 1995), psycho-
logical, experimental, and consumer research literature (Assael 1984). On a goods
market there are mainly two factors in°uencing the buying behavior of a consumer,
the goods' properties and their perceived distribution among other consumers. It
is for example beyond question that any purchase decision depends on the antici-
pated product quality, including functionality, reliability, value for money, and many
further properties. Also, the life span of a product plays a role as it a®ects the fre-
quency of purchases. On the other hand, the product distribution among other
consumers may have an e®ect by simply determining the level of product awareness
or inducing a fashion or even networking. The revision protocol ought to re°ect
these in°uences on the consumer behavior.
A revision protocol ½(x;t) is uniquely de¯ned by the product-dependent alarm clock
rates Ri and the switching probabilities pij(x;t), for which we shall suggest a spec-
i¯cation in the following.
2Note that these consumers replace the broken unit they own and buy a new one.C. Matzke
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The alarm clock rate represents the average frequency at which consumers think
about buying a speci¯c product and hence replacing their old one|unless they
do not yet possess any good. Since this frequency depends on the durability of
the currently owned product, alarm clock rates in general di®er from product to
product. For simplicity, we shall assume the rates Ri to be given for each product
i and to be invariant with time.
Of those people, who do not own any product, the fraction of consumers deciding
to buy product i can be described by the switching probability p0i. When con-
sumers start thinking about buying a speci¯c product they scan the market and
become susceptible to various types of information about possible alternatives. In
the accompanied decision process passive and active decision mechanisms can be
distinguished: When consumers passively encounter a product, its level of familiar-
ity rises, thus increasing the possibility for this product to be bought. On the other
hand, consumers may actively imitate others in buying the same good since the pop-
ularity of a product might give information about the product's past performance
(cf. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993)), so that according to Smallwood and Conlisk
(1979) the consumers' choices are sensitive to market shares or popularities of the
products. Additionally, studies in social psychology support the individual's con-
formity to group norms, i.e. that consumers imitate group behavior (Assael (1984),
p. 371®).
Purely active, purely passive, and intermediate decision mechanisms are categorized
in the following. They imply a proportionality between the switching probability
p0i and the fraction xi of consumers currently owning product i. The mechanisms
are ordered from rather passive to rather active.
• In daily life consumers encounter product i at a frequency proportional to its
distribution xi among the population. Hence, familiarity with the good and
proneness to buy it rise accordingly.
• A consumer's idea of an ideal product is partly shaped by the surroundings.
Product characteristics often observed are commonly desired. The intensity of
in°uence by good i and thus proneness to buy it may be assumed proportional
to its frequency xi.
• Information about products can be obtained from various media (including
the Internet), e.g. experience is exchanged on product evaluation websites.
The media in total roughly re°ect the real world including the market; the
more widespread a product is, the more frequently the media report about it,
thereby increasing product awareness proportionally to xi.
• The expected quality of a product is often inferred from the number of sales,
assuming that superior products always ¯nd a ready market. The prevalently
perceived indicator is thus the observed distribution xi.
• Consumers also actively ask around their friends and let their purchase de-
cision be in°uenced by the found product distribution, which on averageC. Matzke
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matches the xi. For certain goods, networking may play a role as well, intrin-
sically implying the positive e®ect of high xi on the sales of product i.
• Finally, a fashion might be induced by a high distribution of a speci¯c product,
leading to even higher sales of that product.
In summary, we may assume a linear relation between switching probability p0i and
xi as a ¯rst approximation, that is p0i » xi. The proportionality factor, denoted
'i, still remains to be determined. Generally, it di®ers from product to product









must also hold for any state xi = 1; xj6=i = 0. 'i constitutes the accumulated
in°uence of product frequency on the consumers' purchase decision via all di®erent
mechanisms. It can be interpreted as the intensity by which a consumer is convinced
during an encounter with the product and is therefore termed convincement factor
in the following. It is similar to an anticipated product quality. Of course, 'i does
depend on the good properties as there are the price, the (expected) quality, the
strength of networking, and fashion e®ects for that product etc. To summarize,
p0i = 'ixi; i 6= 0: (6)
Let us now turn to those people owning product i. Someone who is content with
that good, tends to buy a new unit of that good when the alarm clock rings, even
though a better product might exist. Surveying the market is time-consuming,
and furthermore, consumers usually act conservatively and avoid changes, so that
the same product i is bought. Assael (1984, p. 53) summarizes several studies
on the topic and comes to the conclusion that a form of habit evolves, leading
to repeat purchases of a product without further information search or evaluating
brand alternatives.
We may deduce that the fraction pii of consumers sticking to product i only depends
on the habit induced by this good or consumer sluggishness and is independent of
any other factors. Also, we will assume this habit level to represent a characteristic
of the product, as justi¯ed by the fact that a consumer usually gets the more
discontent with a product the more often it breaks down or the less satisfactory its
functionality seems. In our model, a ¯xed, product-speci¯c percentage of consumers
will develop a buying habit, so that ¯nally
pii = si 2 [0;1]; i 6= 0: (7)
Obviously, the fraction of switching consumers (1¡pii) divides up into the fractions
pij of people switching to product j 6= i. Naturally, they behave just like those
consumers not yet owning any good, except that they do not purchase product iC. Matzke
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again. Therefore,
pij = (1 ¡ pii)p0j
= (1 ¡ si)'jxj; i 6= 0 ^ j 6= 0;i: (8)
The switching probabilities pi0 and p00 are now uniquely determined by the con-
straints
Pn
j=0 pij = 1, i = 0;:::;n,
p00 = 1 ¡
n X
j=1




pi0 = 1 ¡
n X
j=1













For i = 1;:::;n, the mean dynamic (3) eventually takes the form
_ xi = ½0i +
n X
j=1





















competitive species with coe±cients ai = 'iR0 ¡ (1 ¡ si)Ri, bii = 'iR0, and for
j 6= i; bij = 'i [R0 ¡ (1 ¡ sj)Rj].
All constants Ri, 'i, and si may in principle be time-dependent so that product
modi¯cations or fashion trends can be modeled. However, for a theoretical analysis,
we shall ¯rst assume the coe±cients to be constant. Non-constant coe±cients will
be dealt with in a second paper (Part II: Product pricing when demand follows a
rule of thumb). In particular, we will show how to interpret the convincement factor
'i as a demand function of the product price.
'i and si should be seen as the mean parameters over the whole population of
heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents. The probability 'i, for example, may
be seen as that fraction of the heterogeneous population which is convinced by
product i. Even more, 'i may also be seen as the probability of an individual to
be convinced, i.e. due to the individual's bounded rationality her decision is not
deterministic. Hence, the parameters incorporate both an individual variation and
a global variation over the population.
Modi¯ed population games with the consumer revision protocol motivated above
will frequently be used in the later model analysis. For simplicity we shall therefore
de¯ne the following:
De¯nition 2.4 (Habitual imitative consumers). Agents who follow the above revi-
sion protocol (6) to (10) are called habitual imitative consumers. A modi¯ed pop-
ulation game with such agents is called the demand side of a market with habitual
imitative consumers.C. Matzke

















































f x1 (left) and S1
N¢R0 (right) in time.
3. Model analysis
3.1. Single good market
For the single good case the mean dynamic has the following form
_ x1 = x1'1R0 (ª ¡ x1) (12)
with ª = 1¡ R1
R0
1¡s1
'1 . This ordinary di®erential equation can be solved analytically.










with dimensionless time ¿ = tR0. The evolution of the population x1 either has a
sigmoidal shape with initial exponential growth and saturation value ª (¯gure 1)
or|in case of an undesirable product|immediately decays to zero.
De¯nition 3.1 (Feasibility). We call a good feasible if a positive number of con-
sumers owns the product in the steady state.
In this case, the number of sales is positive at least within a certain time period.
Mathematically, feasibility of a good is determined by the parameter ª, which can
readily be shown by investigating the stability of the (unique) steady states x1 = 0
and x1 = ª respectively. Figure 2 shows a transcritical bifurcation to occur at
ª = 0 which renders the steady state x1 = 0 instable and x1 = ª stable. Hence we
obtain:
Proposition 3.1. The single product on a market with habitual imitative consumers
is feasible i® ª > 0. 2
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Figure 2: Transcritical bifurcation with stable (solid line) and unstable (dashed line)









































































Figure 3: Comparative statics ofS1




'1 . In each graph, the ¯xed parameters have the values R1
R0 = 1,
x1(0) = 0:001, '1 = 0:9, s1 = 0:99. The arrows indicate the variation of
the curve for an increasing parameter value, where the parameter values




'1 are varied from zero to two in steps of 0:1.
We may assume that the initial condition x1(0) > 0 is near zero. Depending on R1
R0 ¢
2¡s1
'1 , the sales can take qualitatively di®erent shapes (¯gure1 right) corresponding
to di®erent patterns of monopoly product life cycles:
For R1
R0 ¢ 2¡s1
'1 < 1 we ¯nd an initial exponential growth, a maximum, and then
a decay with saturation. Intuitively, the stronger the e®ect of habituation s1 or
imitation '1 (i.e. the more convincing the product is), the stronger is the increase
of the subpopulation. After a maximum is reached however, the e®ect of product
durability gains in importance, since the most purchases are replacements of broken
products. Hence, the sales decrease and approach a saturation value. In the special
case R1
R0 ¢ 2¡s1
'1 = 0 of an in¯nitely durable good (R1 = 0), the saturation value
is zero since once the good is bought, the consumer owns it forever and does not
purchase another unit of this product.
For R1
R0 ¢ 2¡s1
'1 ¸ 1 the curve is sigmoidal. In this case habit and imitation cause an
initial increase, then the good has to be replaced quite often and a saturation value
is approached.
S1 is uniquely determined by three parameters, s1, '1, and R1
R0, which together with
R1
R0 ¢ 2¡s1
'1 lend themselves for a comparative statics analysis (¯gure 3). Generally,




(i.e. the system becomes faster), and the saturation value increases, which can also
be directly inferred from equation (15) and the mean dynamic (12). The e®ect is
especially sensitive to changes in '1. These results are intuitive, since rising habit,
imitation, and replacement rates are indeed expected to speed up the system and
to cause more frequent purchases.C. Matzke
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A single product market can be a model of di®erent ¯rm constellations: Either a
monopoly produces the good or an oligopoly, where all ¯rms produce exactly the
same good and the brands do not in°uence the consumers' decision (the consumers
do not even di®erentiate between them by any means).
3.2. Two goods market
In the two goods market the mean dynamic has the form
_ xi = xi'iR0 [ªi ¡ xi ¡ ©jxj]; i = 1;2; j 6= i; (16)
where the ©j = 1 ¡
Rj
R0(1 ¡ sj) are the slopes of the nullclines in the corresponding




are the intersections of nullclines with the axes and thus represent the respective
saturation values of the single good case. Obviously, the ªi have to be positive for
feasible goods, which we will assume in the following.
Phase planes are a very elegant representation of the dynamic system, in which the
nullclines divide the state space into regions with _ xi > 0 and _ xi < 0. Steady states
are given by the intersection points x = (x1;x2) of nullclines _ x1 = 0 and _ x2 = 0.









; xB = (0;ª2); xC = (ª1;0); xD = (0;0):
xD, the trivial steady state, is instable. For a stability analysis of the other steady
states two cases have to be distinguished, xA 2 R2
¸0 and xA 62 R2
¸0 respectively
(cf. ¯gure 4). For the description of the time evolution of populations x1 and x2
and the according product life cycles we may again assume x1(0);x2(0) > 0 to be
near zero.
1. xA 2 R2
¸0. This is possible if either the denominators and numerators of xA
1
and xA
2 are all positive (1a) or all zero (1b), in which case the nullclines lie on
top of each other.
a) 1 > ©1©2, ª1 > ©2ª2, ª2 > ©1ª1 (¯gure 4 left). The only stable
steady state is xA. Hence the products coexist lastingly on the market.
Depending on the initial condition, x1 or x2 may have a maximum before
approaching the saturation value; the form of the trajectory strongly
depends on its starting point.
For the product life cycles|similar to the single good case|a maximum
may or may not exist depending on the parameter values. The num-
ber of products sold initially and overall strongly depends on the initial
condition.
b) 1 = ©1©2, ª1 = ©2ª2, ª2 = ©1ª1 (¯gure 4 middle). This case occurs
for either Ri = 0 or si = 1 for i = 1;2, i.e. for in¯nitely durable goods orC. Matzke
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Figure 4: Phase planes for all three possible cases 1a, 1b, 2 (from left to right), with
nullclines (solid lines) and one trajectory (dotted line) starting near zero
each. The (asymptotically) stable steady states are indicated by ¯lled
circles. Resulting product life cycles are displayed beneath each diagram.
perfect habituation. xA degenerates to a continuous line of (not asymp-
totically) stable steady states. x1(t) and x2(t) are monotonous, while
the sales evolution may exhibit a maximum depending on the Ri. For
in¯nitely durable goods (Ri = 0, i = 1;2) the sales eventually approach
zero.
2. xA = 2 R2
¸0 (¯gure 4 right). Without loss of generality let ª1 > ©2ª2 (other-
wise simply renumber the species; ª1 < ©2ª2 and ª2 < ©1ª1 is not possible
for ©i · 1). Since either xA
1 or xA
2 has to be negative to prevent an intersection
of nullclines in R2
¸0, this implies 1 = ©1©2 or ª2 < ©1ª1. xC is stable and
xB is instable (reverse for ª1 < ©2ª2 and ª2 > ©1ª1). Hence, one product
(here product 2) dies out and the other product survives on the market. For
the vanishing product, both the subpopulation and sales reach a maximum
and then approach zero. The corresponding curves of the surviving product
qualitatively behave as in the single good case. The total sales of the inferior
product strongly depend on the initial condition.
The bifurcation diagram in ¯gure 5 illustrates the parameter regions for the di®erent
cases, in particular the region of coexistence (1a,1b) and the region of exclusion of
a product (2). The following proposition can immediately be inferred:
Proposition 3.2. Product 1 is feasible on a two goods market with habitual imita-
tive consumers, i® either ª1 > 0 and ª2 · 0 or ª1 > ©2ª2. The analogous result
holds for product 2. 2
Since ªi encodes the \quality" of the good (ªi is large for high durability, con-
vincement, and habituation factor), the previous proposition basically performs a
comparison of product qualities. However, due to the consumers' heterogeneity andC. Matzke










Figure 5:Bifurcation diagram. ( 1a) represents the coexistence region of both prod-
ucts, good 2 dies out in ( 2a) and good 1 in ( 2b). The region below
©1©2 = 1 cannot be reached.
bounded rationality, the\quality"of one good need only be larger than the\quality"
of the other downscaled by a factor ©j, which is monotonously increasing with the
habit induction by the competing product.
A further, quite intuitive result follows directly from the phase planes in ¯gure 4:
Proposition 3.3. If a competitor enters a single good market with habitual imitative
consumers, the steady state market share of the incumbent decreases, while the joint
market share of entrant and incumbent increases. Formally,
x¤
i · ªi = x?
i · x¤
1 + x¤
2; i = 1;2; (17)
where x¤
i is the (or a) stable steady state value of xi in the two goods market and
x?
i the steady state value in the single good market. 2
As in the single good case, a two product market can model di®erent ¯rm constel-
lations: There might be a monopoly producing both goods, or the products are
o®ered by a duopoly or even oligopoly, but with only two distinguishable goods.
Equation (17) suggests that it might be bene¯cial for a monopoly to o®er a variety
of goods instead of just one (due to their bounded rationality this even holds for
completely homogeneous consumers, in which case a single, optimally ¯tted product
would seem more pro¯table at ¯rst glance).
3.3. n goods market
Extension to multi-goods markets, where the mean dynamic takes the form
_ xi = xi'iR0
2





5; i = 1;:::;n; (18)
is obvious and will therefore be kept brief here. We will only derive the feasibility
condition for the nth good (and hence for any good after renumbering) and take a
look at the special case of a symmetric market. In the following we will abbreviate
vectors of scalars according to (¾i)i=1;:::;m = ~ ¾. Also, we will need the following
lemma, whose proof is given in the appendix:C. Matzke
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Lemma 3.4. Let 0 < ©i < 1 and let An for n 2 N be the matrix de¯ned as
(An)ij =
(
1; i = j;
©j; i 6= j;
i;j = 1:::n:
Then det(An) > 0.
Now we can characterize the feasibility of a good:
Proposition 3.5. Consider an n-product market with habitual imitative consumers




n¡1~ ª ¢ ~ © = ~ ~ x ¢ ~ © =
n¡1 X
i=1
©i~ xi for (An¡1)ij =
(
1; i = j;
©j; i 6= j;
where ~ ~ x is the vector of market shares on the (n ¡ 1)-goods market (i.e. without
product n).
In this proposition, the identity A
¡1
n¡1(ª1;:::;ªn¡1)T = (~ x1;:::; ~ xn¡1)T results
from the steady state equations of the mean dynamic (18) for the (n ¡ 1)-goods
market if all market shares are non-zero. Hence, intuitively, the above proposition
implies that the (hypothetic) monopoly market share ªn has to be larger than the
weighted sum of market shares of products 1 to n¡1, where the weights ©i increase
with habit induction. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
For a sensible market model, we postulate that it be consistent with our economic
intuition. The next few lines are devoted to such a proof of consistency: We aim to
show the intuitive fact that competition becomes harder when another competitor
enters the market. For this purpose, let ¹ ªn¡1 be the feasibility boundary from
proposition 3.5 for an nth product to enter a market with n¡1 existing products and
with habitual imitative consumers. Furthermore, let ¹ ªn¡2;j be the same feasibility
boundary, however, only for entering a market with just n ¡ 2 existing products,
namely all products from the (n¡1)-goods market except for product j. Then the
following lemma can be proven:
Lemma 3.6. Under the conditions of the previous proposition and with ¹ ªn¡1 and
¹ ªn¡2;j as just de¯ned,
¹ ªn¡1 ¡ ¹ ªn¡2;j =
n¡1 Y
i=1;i6=j





We shall not give the tedious proof here, however, the reader may easily verify the
relation by trying out di®erent n. This lemma now yields the desired result:
Proposition 3.7. In a market with habitual imitative consumers, competition gets
harder the more competitors enter the market, i.e.
¹ ªn¡1 > ¹ ªn¡2;j for all j = 1;:::n ¡ 1:C. Matzke
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Hence, it is harder to enter the (n ¡ 1)-goods market than it is to enter the same
market, but with any one of the products removed.
Proof. (1 ¡ ©i) is positive due to 0 < ©i < 1. (ªj ¡ ¹ ªn¡2;j) is positive since
otherwise product j would not be feasible and would hence not exist. Thus the
result follows from lemma 3.6 together with lemma 3.4.
We shall now brie°y provide a further interpretation of the feasibility condition
in proposition 3.5: Analogously to ¹ ªn¡2;j, let the matrix An¡2;j be de¯ned by
omitting the jth row and the jth column of matrix An¡1. Furthermore, let matrix
(An)i!~ ª be equal to An with column i replaced by ~ ª, let the vector of ones be


































ªj ¡ ¹ ªn¡2;j
¤
Hence, the lower feasibility bound ¹ ªn¡1 can be interpreted as the weighted sum of
the feasibility (ªj¡ ¹ ªn¡2;j) of all existing products. (ªj¡ ¹ ªn¡2;j) indeed expresses
how much more feasible good j is in comparison with the minimum to exist on the
market.
In the special case of a symmetric market with n¡1 identical products, A
¡1
n¡1 has a
simple form, which allows to look at proposition3.5 from a slightly di®erent view-
point. The following corollary compares the quality of the entrant with the quality
of the incumbents and enables us to examine this relation for growing numbers of
products.
Corollary 3.8. Consider a symmetric (n ¡ 1)-product market with identical ¯rms
(©i = ©, ªi = ª) and habitual imitative consumers on which the products coexist
with 0 < © < 1. Then a new (not necessarily identical) nth product is feasible i®
ªn >
(n ¡ 1)©ª
1 + (n ¡ 2)©
:
Proof. By calculating A
¡1






(1¡©)[1+(n¡2)©]; i = j;
¡©
(1¡©)[1+(n¡2)©]; i 6= j:C. Matzke
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Hence, by proposition 3.5,
ªn > A
¡1
n¡1~ ª ¢ ~ © =
(n ¡ 1)©ª
1 + (n ¡ 2)©
:
Obviously, the\quality"ªn of the new nth product may always be smaller than the
\quality" ª of the n ¡ 1 incumbents. However, the factor
(n¡1)©ª
1+(n¡2)© monotonously
increases with the number of products n, and in the limit
ªn >
(n ¡ 1)©ª
1 + (n ¡ 2)©
n!1 ¡! ª
so that the entrant's \quality" has to approach the incumbents' \quality" ª.
4. Discussion
So far we have worked out how the sales dynamics of products or brands evolve in an
environment with habitual imitative consumers and how this evolution is in°uenced
by the product dependent habit and imitation parameters. In this section we shall
brie°y mention further implications for ¯rms deduced from the model.
For non-varying products and thus ¯xed habit and imitation parameter values, the
¯nal steady state cannot be in°uenced by the ¯rms (unless the parameter values are
¯xed functions 'i(x1;:::;xn), si(x1;:::;xn) of the state so that the mean dynamic
(11) no longer has Lotka-Volterra form). Nevertheless, a moderately large initial
share xi(t = 0) generally is pro¯table for ¯rms (i.e. to give away a number of
product units for free initially) in order to sell more product units on the whole.
The e®ect arises, because a larger initial product share leads to a faster approach
of the steady state. Similarly it pays o® for a ¯rm to launch a product early in
comparison to the competitors in order to have a large market share when the other
products enter the market. This causes sales advantages such as the initial hump
in ¯gure 4 (left).
Of course any real market which is to be modeled needs careful choice of habit, imi-
tation, and durability parameters. Such parameters can be obtained from matching
empirical curves with simulated sales development, for instance using the observed
time scales and steady state market shares. As an example consider the evolution
of consumption of ¯lter cigarettes as found in Polli and Cook (1969, p. 389). Here
we will regard ¯lter cigarettes as a product class within which brand di®erences (at
least initially) do not matter much so that a monopoly approximation (i.e. there
are two options: buying or not buying ¯lter cigarettes) may be appropriate. The
fact that habit plays a strong role here is unquestionable (and rumor has it that
imitation takes place as well). From the data we roughly estimated a high (packet)
consumption rate of R1 = 200 per year and a rather low consideration frequency of
R0 = 20 per year as well as a low imitation of '1 = 0:01. Habit on the other hand isC. Matzke
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Figure 6: Figure from Polli and Cook (1969) with simulated sales evolution of ¯lter
cigarettes in the USA overlaid (solid, smooth line).
close to one with s1 = 0:9992. This results in x1 = 20% of the population smoking
¯lter cigarettes in the steady state, which seems a reasonable estimate considering
that according to Polli and Cook (1969) in the 1960s ¯lter cigarettes consumption
amounted to roughly 40% of total cigarette consumption (and nearly half the US
population were smokers). The curves are given in ¯gure 6.
A subsequent work (Part II: Product pricing when demand follows a rule of thumb)
will additionally model the supply side of the market and analyze ¯rm's pricing or
advertising strategies as well as the welfare in such a market. Moreover, we show
how product life cycles of the typically empirically supported form can be generated
in a market with habitual imitative consumers.
5. Conclusion
We examined the evolution of a consumer market, where boundedly rational con-
sumers follow rules of thumb, basing their decisions on imitation and habit. To
achieve this goal we set up a modi¯ed population game with a corresponding re-
vision protocol as framework. We then analyzed the resulting sales evolution of
products and investigated product feasibility in a market with habitual imitative
consumers. The behavioral parameters can be adapted to match observed sales evo-
lutions of products or product classes, and the introduced methodology allows for
broad applications and qualitative theoretical analysis. In particular, demand by
habitual imitative consumers will serve as the basis for modeling a strategic supply
side in subsequent work.
One of the main achievements of this paper consists in having cast psychological
and experimental results into a mathematical model with boundedly rational and
habitual imitative consumers, as well as investigation of the consequences. For
example, such a market model is shown to be consistent with standard economic
intuition in that it becomes more di±cult for products to survive on the market the
more competitors enter the market.C. Matzke
B. Wirth Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales 20
Acknowledgement
For many valuable comments we are grateful to Frank Riedel, Paul Heidhues, Tymon
Tatur, Tymo¯y Mylovanov, Johannes MÄ unster and all seminar participants of the
BGSE Micro Workshop at the University of Bonn.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of lemma 3.4
Proof. Consider the matrix function M(t) := I +t(An¡I) such that M(0) = I and
M(1) = An, where I denotes the identity matrix. Since det(M) is continuous in M,
it is also continuous in t. If det(M(1)) were non-positive, then according to Rolle's
theorem there would exist some t 2 (0;1] with det(M(t)) = 0. However, det(M(t))
cannot be zero due to the following reasoning: For a contradiction, assume the





























which together with ©i < 1 implies ®i = k
1¡©i, for some number k. Plugging this










which is impossible for ©i
1¡©i > 0.
A.2. Proof of proposition 3.5
Proof. For the computation, assume that also product n exists in the steady state.
1. Linear system of equations: Since by assumption xi > 0 in the steady state
for i = 1;:::;n we obtain a linear system of steady state equations from the
mean dynamic (18):
An~ x = ~ ªC. Matzke
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2. Cramer's rule: Due to the previous step, An is invertible. According to







where matrix (An)i!~ ª equals An with column i replaced by ~ ª.
3. Cramer's rule backwards: Let us denote the vector of ones by~ 1 and let M6i;6j be
matrix M with the ith row and jth column removed. Using Laplace expansion

























(¡1)i+j©iªi©j det(((An¡1)j!~ 1)6j;6i) ¡
n¡1 X
i=1





(¡1)i+j©iªi©j det(((An¡1)i!~ 1)6i;6j) ¡
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where the last step follows from Cramer's rule and Laplace expansion has been
applied various times.
Overall, we obtain
product n feasible , xn > 0
lemma3:4 , xn det(An) > 0
step2
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